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Import demand of bananas in the EU 
 
The EU banana market has been of enormous interest for researchers for a long time. Prior to 
the policy unification brought by the Common Market Organization for Bananas (CMOB), 
many authors studied the implications of the multi policy scheme prevalent before 1993. This 
interest derived from the distorting effects of those import policies not only within the EU but 
also in the world banana market. The interest for studying the EU banana situation increased 
with the CMOB. Several factors contributed to this but probably the main reason was the 
adverse reactions generated by this policy in different sectors. 
For example, some argue the EU protected certain low-income countries to the 
detriment of other developing nations that were also highly dependent on banana trade. 
Additionally, the aid system that accompanied the import regime was highly inefficient. Only a 
small proportion of the money intended to compensate preferred suppliers for any loss derived 
from the import system actually reached its target. The issue about the EU banana market 
became even more complicated when the interests of US multinational fruit companies entered 
the scenario. The interest for the European Union banana market resumed with the endorsement 
of the banana agreement between the EU and the United States in 2002. 
What is interesting about the many analyses of this market is that the conclusions 
reached by them vary considerably. Divergences in the results are found not only in the 
magnitude of the effects but also in the way the involved parties have been affected by the 
alternative import policies. One of the main reasons for those discrepancies is that for each 
evaluation, a different set of demand parameters has been used. A common denominator to the 
estimations used is that the general demand restrictions necessary to make them consistent with   3
economic theory has not been incorporated. Table 1 summarizes a few of the demand elasticity 
set ups and the welfare effects that some authors have estimated for the EU banana market. 
It is obvious from those results that demand parameters highly affect the results 
obtained from the welfare analysis. Now, that a new banana import agreement has emerged in 
the EU, an adequate estimation of its import demand becomes relevant from a policy analysis 
perspective. The objective of this project is to estimate a well-defined demand system to 
generate reliable elasticities to facilitate future welfare analysis of the EU banana market. 
Simulations to calculate preliminary welfare effects of the new import regime on Latin 
American producers and on EU consumers of bananas from this region are also performed.  
The paper is organized in two main sections. Section one presents the methodology 
used to estimate the import demand elasticities for bananas in the EU. The results obtained are 
summarized and discussed. Section two deals with the welfare estimations for the new import 
regime that the EU intends to bring in January 2006. The welfare analysis centers on the Latin 
American region, therefore, just changes in the wellbeing of producers from that region and in 
EU consumers of Latin American bananas are estimated.    4
Table 1. Summary of some demand elasticities and welfare analysis of previous evaluations of the EU banana market. 
 
Source  Method for calculating elasticities  Comparison period  Welfare cost for EU consumers
(a) 
Borell and Yang (1990)  Elasticities assumed  Before 1993  693 
Matthews (1992)  Elasticities assumed based on prior 
studies 
Before 1993  579 
Borell and Cuthbertson quoted 
in Matthews 1992 
Elasticities assumed  Before 1993  1438 
Borell and Yang (1992)  Elasticities assumed  Before 1993  1610 
McInerney and Person (1992)    Before 1993  1600 
Read (1994)  Unpublished  Before 1993  642 
Borell (1994)  Elasticities assumed  After 19993  2300 
Euro PA (1995)  Same as Borell (1994)  After 19993  800-1000 
Source: H. Kox,  
(a) Million US$ 
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Banana import demand elasticities in the European Union 
 
Initially, two different models were estimated for determining whether a regular o an inverse 
demand system better fitted the way the EU banana market behaves. The first corresponded to 
the almost ideal demand system (AIDS), under the usual assumption that quantities imported 
are determined by the import price. This is the demand definition used by most researchers. 
The second model corresponded to the inverse almost ideal demand system (IAIDS) which 
assumes that prices adjust to quantities. This assumption was reasonable under the current 
import scheme, when imports are limited by quotas. However, with the forthcoming 
elimination of all quotas in January 2006, that will not longer be the case. 
Total supply of bananas en the EU is decomposed into four components, each 
representing a different supplier region. The first corresponds to Latin America, the main 
supplier of the EU. The second is composed of the countries from Africa, the Caribbean and 
Pacific that has traditionally enjoyed preference access to the EU market. The third region 
comprises the communitarian countries, which are mainly overseas territories of Greece, Spain, 
France and Portugal. Finally, the last exporting region comprises all other countries (rest of the 
world).  
The almost ideal demand system can be obtained from an indirect utility function, 
V(p,m), of the form shown in (1):  
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And i,j represents the various banana producing regions (e.g. Latin America, ACP, 
Others, EU ); p is a price vector containing import prices from each exporting region i; I is total 
expenditure in imported bananas in the EU;  0 α ,  i α , ij γ  and  i β are the parameters estimated. 
Solving for I we can got the following expenditure function: 
) ( ) ( ) , ( p a p b u p E
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Where b(p) and a(p) correspond to the definitions previously given and u is utility level. By 
Shephard’s lemma, differentiating the log of this function with respect to the log of each price, 
we got a share compensated equation (wi) of EU imports from each region. These equations are 
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After solving equation 0 for u and plugging the solution back in the compensated share 
equation, we obtained uncompensated share equations, which compose the system that we 
estimated. See equation 0. 
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Derivation of the uncompensated share equations with respect to the appropriate 
variable let us derive uncompensated price ( ij ε ) and income ( im ε ) elasticities. They are of the 






















ε            ( 8 )  
Where   ij δ  is the Kronecker delta, which takes a value of 1 when i=j and zero otherwise. 
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These elasticities are meaningful since they are a pure representation of the substitution 
relationships between exporting regions. They allows us to exactly determine whether imports 
from the different regions are either complementary or substitutes. Finally, to be consistent 






The data comprise annual observations for the period 1964 to 1999. Trade flows (value and 
quantity) are decomposed by exporter country. These data were obtained from the World Trade 
Annual of the United Nations. Due to the way the data are reported, it is not possible to 
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determine the country where the trade flows within the EU come from. Therefore, statistics for 
the communitarian suppliers include two different flows. One corresponds to the domestic from 
Portugal, Spain, Greece and France. The other constitutes re-exports within the EU countries. 
As a result, imports statistics from the EU might be over estimated.  
Statistics of the gross domestic product (GDP), commodity price index (CPI) and 
population were obtained from the International Financial Statistics of the International 
Monetary Fund. Domestic prices of bananas from France, Italy and Greece were obtained from 
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) web site. Nominal prices were converted to real 
values using 2002 as the base year. 
The descriptive statistics for the data are shown in Table 2.  It can be seen that Latin 
American is by any means the main supplier of bananas to the EU. Per capita imports from this 
region averaged 5 kg a year during the period 1969 – 2002. Those flows had also the greater 
variability, which might be a result of the different import regimes that has ruled the EU during 
the analyzed period and that usually target imports from Latin America.  
In the case of the quantities exported to the EU by the ACP and the EU regions, are 
about the same. However, exports from the ACP seem more stable over time. An explanation 
for the behavior of the EU flows might be due to the re-exports portion of these flows,  which 
started to being allowed in 1993. Bananas from Latin America are also the cheapest and its 
prices present less variability. As is has been mentioned in existent literature, bananas from 
communitarian countries are the most expensive, followed by the ACP. Import prices from 
other suppliers are lower than from those regions but still are not competitive in relation to 
Latin America.   9
Table 2. Data’s descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean  St.  Deviation  Variance Minimum  Maximum
Prices         
Latin America  0.292 0.227 0.052 0.000  0.706
ACP 0.321 0.269 0.072 0.000  0.725
EU 0.356 0.289 0.084 0.026  0.884
Others 0.299 0.280 0.078 0.006  0.912
Quantities         
Latin America  5.077 2.005 4.020 0.000  8.491
ACP 1.429 0.456 0.208 0.000  2.348
EU 1.352 0.647 0.418 0.048  2.864
Others 0.206 0.228 0.052 0.009  0.702
Expenditure 3.038 3.057 9.342 0.007  8.601
(1) Prices are US$/kg. 




Table 3 presents the parameters obtained from the estimation of the AIDS model. All the 
parameters directly obtained from the model were significant at a 5% confidence level, which 
makes the elasticity estimated highly reliable. Based on the demand restrictions previously 
imposed to the system, values for the eliminated parameters were recovered. These are the 
values for which the standard error and the T-ratios are not reported.    10
Table 3. Parameter estimated from the AIDS model for the EU import demand of 
bananas 
Parameter Coef. St.  Error  T-Ratio    Parameter  Coef.  St. 
Error 
T-Ratio 
α0 -4502.50  46.68  -96.45    γ23 0.81  0.17  4.80 
α1 43.02  10.64  4.04    γ24 -0.52  0.07  -7.16 
α2 24.79  1.73  14.33    γ34 2.89  0.61  4.75 
α3 -151.30  19.03  -7.95    α4 84.49     
β1 -0.01  0.00  -3.90    β4 -0.02     
β2 -0.01  0.00  -13.52    γ11 -0.31     
β3 0.03  0.00  7.65    γ22 -0.01     
γ12 -0.28  0.08  -3.66    γ33 -5.06    
γ13 1.37  0.56  2.46    γ 44 -1.59     
γ14 -0.78  0.27  -2.86         
 
Uncompensated and income elasticities are shown in Table 4. Income elasticities 
indicate that bananas from the Latin America and the ACP regions can be considered normal 
goods. However, demand for bananas from these regions increases less than proportionally than 
the income of the EU population. Communitarian bananas on the other hand are luxury goods 
since their consumption increases more than proportionally than increases in income. Finally, 
the income elasticity for the demand from other sources is the close to zero, which makes 
bananas from the rest of the world an inferior good for the EU consumers. 
The four own price elasticities have the expected negative sign. An important 
conclusion that can be drawn from them is that the EU demand for bananas from all regions is 
relative inelastic. Import demand from ACP is the least elastic (-0.224), followed by the EU      11
(-0. 627) and other suppliers (-0.778). Import demand from Latin America is the most sensitive 
to own price changes (-0.843). 
 
Table 4. Uncompensated and Income Elasticities from the AIDS model 
Prices/Quantities Latin  America  ACP  EU  Others 
Latin America  -0.843 -0.274  -0.512  1.666 
ACP  -0.073  -0.224 -0.188 -2.322 
EU  -0.104 -0.161  -0.627  1.349 
Others 
0.035 -0.308  0.135  -0.778 
Income 
0.985  0.967 1.192 0.084 
 
To determine whether bananas from the four different sources are complements or 
substitutes, compensated price elasticities were calculated. The advantage of this procedure is 
that the income effect is eliminated, letting us to analyze the pure price effect and categorize the 
goods as q-net complements or q-net substitutes.  
Compensated elasticities are summarized in Table 5. EU import demand from all regions 
but ACP and other suppliers are substitutes. In the case of Latin America, its demand is most 
sensitive to price changes of ACP bananas, which makes sense since those two regions are the 
main suppliers of the EU. On the other hand, bananas from the ACP and other sources are 
complements.   
It would be interesting to compare these estimates to those used by other authors on their 
analysis. However, as shown in Table 1, most of the demand parameters used are either 
hypothetical or not reported.    12
Table 5. Compensated Elasticities from the AIDS model 
 Latin  America  ACP  EU  Others 
Latin America  -0.2261 0.3515 0.3212 1.5020 
ACP 0.0898 -0.0077 -0.0331 -2.4184 
EU 0.0874 -0.0352 -0.4653 1.4781 
Others 0.0489 -0.3086 0.1771 -0.5617 
 
 
II. Welfare Analysis 
 
The new import policy proposed by the EU for the import of bananas corresponds to the second 
stage of the signed agreement between the EU and the United States. In this stage, which will 
come into effect in 2006, exporters will compete on the basis of differentiated tariffs and all 
regional or country-specific quotas will be eliminated.  The EU has proposed a new tariff level 
of 230 euros for Latin America, for example. 
At this point, it is uncertain whether the new tariff level of 230 euros will materialize as 
Latin American countries consider the tax to be excessive and prohibitive. A panel formed by 
Ecuador, Costa Rica,  and Colombia opened a consultation process in the WTO alleging that 
the new tariff violated GATT principles as it inhibits Latin American banana producers in their 
ability to compete with the ACP region. The EU, on the other hand, maintains that the proposed 
system is legal and, in fact, off the table for discussion as the tariff came about as a necessary 
feature in the 2002 agreement with the US.    13
Figure 1 presents a simple supply and demand analysis of the potential effect of 
tarrification. As shown in Figure 1, the analysis assumes that the initial EU market covered by 
Latin America is characterized by an equilibrium that takes place at point E, with P1 and Q1 
being the respective equilibrium price and quantity. The demand curve is D and the supply 
curve is the line formed by the segments Q1E1S1.  The portion Q1E1 corresponds to the inelastic 
segment of the Latin American supply under the quota. That is, this is the price range where it 
is not profitable to export any quantity above the quota level because of the high tariff applied 
to those exports (680 euros per ton). Above P1, exporters would be willing to export more than 
the 2.5 million-ton quota thus supply becomes upward sloping.  
Once the new policy comes into effect, the inelastic portion of the supply curve 
disappears, replaced by a traditional, upward-sloping curve, given by P0ES1. However, the 
higher tariff will result in a decrease in the supply due to the portion of the tax assumed by the 
exporters. This tariff translates into a leftward shift of the supply curve resulting in the new 
equilibrium under the tariff, E2, with P2 and Q2 being the new price and quantity levels.   
To simulate the market situation and changes depicted in Figure 1, the elasticities 
estimated from the AIDS model are used to define a system of demand and supply equations.  
From these, changes in producer and consumer surplus will be calculated for pre- and post-
tariff scenarios under hypothetical market parameters.  We presume that over small changes, 
the demand equations may be approximated using the function as the shown in equation 1. 
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Where i, j represent the various banana producing regions (e.g. Latin America, ACP, 
Others, EU );  i Q  is the EU import demand for bananas from region i;  i A  is a constant term for   14
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the demand for bananas from region i, pi represents the import price from region i; αij is the 
elasticity of the demand from region i with respect to j’s import price; I represents the EU 
income level, and εi stands for the income elasticity of demand for bananas from region i. 
In the case of the supply functions, due to the lack of complete information on supply, 
supply elasticities were not estimated.  Instead, the welfare analysis was performed using 
different scenarios based on four alternative elasticity values (0.5, 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0). Like the 
demand equations, the supply curves are assumed to be of the constant-elasticity form shown in 
Equation 2.  
i
ii i SB p
β =             ( 2 )  
Where Si is the supply of bananas from region i to the EU; Bi represents a constant term 
of region i’s supply equation; pi represents the export price from region i (same as import price) 
and βi represents the price elasticity of region i’s supply. 
The constant terms of both demand and supply curves are used to calibrate the system 
to its initial values, where we have chosen the pre-tariff year of 2002 as the base year.  Relevant 
variables from the AIDS model are quantities, prices and income and we refer to these using 
the following notation: Qio, pio and Io. Using those values and the estimated demand elasticities, 
a constant term for each demand equation (Ai) is obtained by solving Equation 3.  
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A similar procedure is used to calibrate the supply equation for each exporting region. 
The value of the constant term, Bi, is obtained for each elasticity-value scenario by solving for 
this variable as shown in (4).  
i
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Since it is unclear how much the exported quantity from Latin America is going to 
decrease
2 under the new tariff level, the welfare analyses were performed under different 
scenarios with alternative quantity changes that range from -1% to -20%. Based on that new 
quantity, a new constant term for the supply curve from this region (BLA’) is calculated under 
each scenario. Then, the market clearing condition (Qi = Si) is imposed to solve for the new 
optimal price that is,  
i i
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In the case of Latin American producers, since their exports are taxed, this expression 
represents the producer price.  It is assumed that the cost of the tariff is completely transferred 
to consumers. The way consumer and producer prices are related is shown in Equation (8):  
) 1 ( ς + = LA
c
LA p p  
Based on the new price and quantity, one can integrate over the supply curve from the old 
equilibrium price and quantity (pio and Qio) to the new equilibrium price and quantity (
'
i p  
                                                 
2 Latin American exporters argue that they are going to be entirely left out of the market (La Nación. 
Economía en América. January 13, 1995) while EU authorities maintain that this region will keep its access 
unaltered (La Nación. February 4, 1995).   17
and
'
i Q ) to obtain the change in producer surplus (Alston et al. 1997).  This change is given by 
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Table 6 presents the results of the welfare analysis for the several market scenarios analyzed. It 
can be seen that for small quantity changes, the elasticity of supply does not have much effect 
on the new equilibrium price. For example, for a 1% quantity decrease in the imports from       
3,366 tones to 3,332 tones in the EU, the differences in the equilibrium price at alternative 
elasticity levels are less than 0.2%. However, for the scenarios when the quantity decreases 
were bigger, equilibrium prices vary more widely depending on the elasticity level used in the 
analysis. For instance, if the exported quantity decreases by 20%, the new equilibrium price 
would be $0.66 if the supply elasticity were 0.5. Meanwhile, if the value of this parameter is 
changed to 3.00, the new price would be $0.59, which represents a difference of more than 10% 
in the price Latin American producers would receive.  
The analysis of welfare changes indicates that both EU consumers of Latin American 
bananas and producers from this region would be made worse off with the new import regime. 
In the case of consumers, they would purchase a lower quantity at a higher price, although, as 
shown in table 1, differences in the consumer surplus change as result of a 1% and a 20%   18
quantity decrease range from 12% and 23% depending on the supply elasticity. For example, 
losses are of around $1,725 when the quantity imported decreases 1% from 2002 levels for an 
elasticity of 1. If the quantity decrease were of 20%, those loses would rise to $2,067. 
The same can not be said for producers’ welfare changes. The welfare lost for Latin 
American producers would increase from $4,330 to $90,507 depending on whether quantity 
decreases by 1% or 20%, respectively.  
A sensitivity analysis to determine the behavior of consumer and producer surplus 
changes with respect to elasticity values not only supports those findings but also gives other 
interesting results. Figure 2 shows how the change in consumer surplus changes as the supply 
elasticity increases. As supply becomes more elastic, the change in consumers’ surplus due to a 
1% quantity decrease decreases at a decreasing rate. The same behavior is observed for any 
quantity change. 
In the case of producers, the degree of surplus loss from the supply being more elastic 
depends on the magnitude of the elasticities. For low values, the change in welfare lost 
increases as the supply becomes more elastic. However, after attaining a supply elasticity of 
one, this relationship reverses and the change in producers’ surplus losses become lower as 
their supply gets more elastic (note, these are changes in producer  surplus, not the level of 
surplus).  
  
   19
Table 6. Results from the Welfare Analysis of the EU import tariff to Latin American suppliers 
 
Percentage change in LAT imports  Latin 
American 
supply -1.0% -3.0%  -5.0%  -7.5% -10.0%  -15.0%  -20.0% 
New producer price ($/kg) 
0.50 0.564  0.573 0.582 0.593 0.606 0.632 0.661 
1.00 0.563  0.569 0.576 0.584 0.593 0.612 0.632 
2.00 0.562  0.566 0.570 0.575 0.581 0.593 0.606 
3.00 0.561  0.564 0.567 0.571 0.575 0.584 0.593 
New consumer price ($/kg) 
0.50 0.809  0.8178  0.827 0.838 0.851 0.877 0.906 
1.00 0.808  0.8143  0.821 0.829 0.838 0.857 0.877 
2.00 0.807  0.8110  0.815 0.821 0.826 0.838 0.851 
3.00 0.806  0.8094  0.812 0.816 0.821 0.829 0.838 
Change in Consumer surplus from Latin American banana imports (2002 US$) 
0.50  -1728.50  -1766.47 -1805.34 -1855.27 -1906.77 -2014.85 -2130.45 
1.00  -1725.71  -1757.99 -1791.02 -1833.42 -1877.13 -1968.78 -2066.69 
2.00  -1722.06  -1746.89 -1772.28 -1804.86 -1838.42 -1908.71 -1983.67 
3.00  -1719.77  -1739.95 -1760.57 -1787.03 -1814.26 -1871.26 -1931.99 
Change in LAT Producers surplus (2002 US$) 
0.50  -4322.20 -13038.22 -21852.29 -33012.67 -44337.91 -67512.03 -91438.18 
1.00  -4330.20 -13046.99 -21840.83 -32945.03 -44178.06 -67051.54 -90506.91 
2.00  -3779.31 -11372.40 -19012.47 -28630.58 -38326.78 -57964.91 -77951.86 
3.00  -3227.18 -9704.17 -16211.98  -24391.32  -32621.72  -49242.82  -66090.72   20
Figure 2. Change in consumer surplus at alternative supply elasticity values 
























































Figure 3. Change in producer surplus at alternative elasticity values 
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